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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Factortame judgment is compatible with the traditional U.K.
doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament. Part I examines the Court of Justice’s approach to the
supremacy of Community law and the traditional U.K. approach to supremacy. Part II discusses
the factual and procedural background of Factortame, the judgment of the Court of Justice, and the
reasoning of the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro. Part III suggests that Factortame indicates
a willingness of the Court of Justice to allow the United Kingdom to adhere to its traditional view
of Community law precedence, provided that directly effective Community rights are practically
protected. This Comment concludes that despite the U.K. approach to the supremacy of Com-
munity law, U.K. courts recognize that Parliament is subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the
Community.
COMMENTS
REGINA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT EX
PARTE FACTORTAME LTD.: THE LIMITS OF
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE RULE OF COMMUNITY
LAW*
"Could we, " I said, "somehow contrive one of those lies that come
into being in case of need, of which we were just now speaking, some
one noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not
them, the rest of the city?"'
INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the European Economic Commu-
nity (the "Community" or the "EEC"), 2 the Court ofJustice of
the European Communities (the "Court of Justice") has been
at the forefront of the legal integration of the Community.'
The area in which legal integration contributes most closely to
political integration is perhaps that of the relation between
* This Comment received the 1991 Orlando Conseils Award at Fordham
University School of Law.
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 414b-c (A. Bloom trans. 1968).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-Il), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. The European Communities were founded upon three treaties: the EEC
Treaty; the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18,
1951, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140; and the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 295 U.N.T.S. 259.
3. See P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs AFTER THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
ACT 169-73 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that Court of Justice has often acted as motor of
integration to ensure that Community institutions and Member States comply with
obligations imposed upon them); Kakouris, La relation de lordrejuridique communautaire
avec les ordresjurdiques des Etats membres (Quelques reflexions parfois peu conformistes), in Du
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INT9GRATION, Liber Amicorum, P. Pescatore,
319 (1987) (arguing that legal relationship of Community and Member States is es-
sentially federal); Rasmussen, Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the
European Court, 13 EUR. L. REV. 28, 29 (Feb. 1988) (criticizing Court of Justice's ex-
cessive "normative supranationalism" in jurisprudence of 1960s and 1970s); Cappel-
letti, Is the European Court ofJustice "Running Wild"?, 12 EUR. L. REV. 3, 8 (Feb. 1987)
(advocating legitimacy, based upon Preamble and first Articles of EEC Treaty, of
Court of Justice's pro-integration jurisprudence).
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Community law and the national law of the Member States.4
To this end, the Court ofJustice holds that Community law has
primacy over the national law, including the constitutional law,
of the Member States.5 While Member States accept that
Community law6 prevails over inconsistent national law,7 the
Member States differ in their understanding of the nature of
this precedence. s
The issue of the precedence of Community law is particu-
larly controversial in the United Kingdom because of the tradi-
tional constitutional principles of the sovereignty of Parlia-
ment and the rule of law. 9 The doctrine of the sovereignty of
Parliament holds that there are no legal limits to Parliament's
legislative power.1t The sovereignty of Parliament means that
U.K. courts cannot question the validity of acts of Parliament
and that Parliament can repeal any prior legislation."' The
4. See PJ.G. KAVrEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, supra note 3, at 169-70.
5. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fiur
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8126.
6. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case
106/77, 1978 E.C.R. 629, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8023; Costa v. ENEL, Case
6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023.
7. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that priority of Community
law pertains to national legislation enacted both prior and subsequent to accession to
EEC).
8. See generally H. SCHERMERS & D. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 105-24 (4th ed. 1987); T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 224- 45 (1981). For example, Belgium adopted a monist
position with regard to the primacy of Community law. See Minister for Economic
Affairs v. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse "Le Ski," [ 1972] C.M.L.R. 330 (Belgian Cour de
Cassation). In Italy, however, a dualist view of supremacy prevails as national law
and international law which produces direct effects in the internal legal system are
considered separate and autonomous systems. See S.p.A Granital v. Amministrazione
Finanziaria dello Stato, [1984] I Giur. Ital. 1521 (Corte cost. 1984); Frontini v. Minis-
tero delle Finanze, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (Corte cost. 1973).
9. See infra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing U.K. constitutional princi-
ples of sovereignty of Parliament and rule or supremacy of law).
10. See Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, [1955] CAMBRIDGE L.J., 172, 174; see
infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of sovereignty of Par-
liament).
11. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 62 (E.C.S. Wade 10th ed. 1961). Professor Dicey stated that
[t]here is no legal basis for the theory that judges, as exponents of morality,
may overrule Acts of Parliament. Language which might seem to imply this
amounts in reality to nothing more than the assertion that the judges, when
attempting to ascertain what is the meaning to be affixed to an Act of Parlia-
ment, will presume that Parliament did not intend to violate the ordinary
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doctrine of the rule of law holds that in construing legislation
courts will interpret any uncertain language in favor of com-
mon law principles of the liberty of the citizen.'" As a result of
these two principles, the traditional U.K. view holds that courts
must construe domestic legislation in conformity with Commu-
nity law, but enforce conflicting domestic legislation if Parlia-
ment clearly expresses such a conflicting intention.' 3
In Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame
Limited' ("Factortame"),'4 the Court of Justice delivered a judg-
ment that challenges the traditional U.K. view of the sover-
eignty of Parliament. 5 In Factortame, the Court ofJustice held
that under Community law, national courts must be able to
grant interim protection to rights claimed by individuals under
directly effective Community law.' 6 Where certain precondi-
tions are met, national courts must be able to set aside national
legislation pending the final outcome of the proceedings, as
rules of morality, or the principles of international law, and will therefore,
whenever possible, give such an interpretation to a statutory enactment as
may be consistent with the doctrines both of private and of international
morality. A modern judge would never listen to a barrister who argued that
an Act of Parliament was invalid because it was immoral, or because it went
beyond the limits of Parliamentary authority.
Id. at 62-63 (footnote omitted). The legal ability to repeal any prior legislation in-
cludes prior legislation that purports to entrench itself. See Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v.
Liverpool Corp., [19321 1 K.B. 733. Judge Avory noted that
[sipeaking for myself, I should certainly hold, until the contrary were de-
cided, that no Act of Parliament can effectively provide that no future Act
shall interfere with its provisions .... [If both Acts] cannot stand together
... then the earlier Act is impliedly repealed by the later in accordance with
the maxim 'Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.'
d. at 743-44; see Ellen Street Estates, Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [1934] 1 K.B. 590.
In Ellen Street Estates, Ltd., Lord justice Maugham observed that
[t]he Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the
form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact
that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can
be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent Act Parliament chooses to make it
plain that the earlier statute is being to some extent repealed, effect must be
given to that intention just because it is the will of the Legislature.
Id. at 597.
12. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing Professor A.V. Di-
cey's doctrine of the rule or supremacy of law).
13. See infra notes 53-97 and accompanying text (discussing traditional U.K. view
of supremacy of Community law)
14. Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC
189.
15. Id. at 218-22.
16. Id. at 221.
FACTORTAME
well as pending receipt of a response to questions sent to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(the "Treaty").1 7 Confronting traditional notions of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, Factortame thus declares that U.K. courts
must be given the power to order the temporary disapplication
of an act of Parliament."8
This Comment argues that the Factortame judgment is
compatible with the traditional U.K. doctrine of the supremacy
of Parliament. Part I examines the Court of Justice's approach
to the supremacy of Community law and the traditional U.K.
approach to supremacy. Part II discusses the factual and pro-
cedural background of Factortame, the judgment of the Court of
Justice, and the reasoning of the opinion of Advocate General
Tesauro. Part III suggests that Factortame indicates a willing-
ness of the Court of Justice to allow the United Kingdom to
adhere to its traditional view of Community law precedence,
provided that directly effective Community rights are practi-
cally protected. This Comment concludes that despite the
U.K. approach to the supremacy of Community law, U.K.
courts recognize that Parliament is subject to the ultimate sov-
ereignty of the Community.
I. TWO APPROACHES TO THE SUPREMACY OF
COMMUNITY LA W
A. The Court of Justice's View of Supremacy
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice maintains that
17. Id.; see EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177. Article 177 provides that
[t]he Court ofJustice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpreta-
tion of acts of the institutions of the Community; (c) the interpretation of
the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those stat-
utes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before
the Court of Justice.
Id.
18. Factortame, [1990] 2 CEC at 221.
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the Community and national legal regimes have become a uni-
fied legal order.'" In this unified order, Community norms
possess their own supreme identity separate from national
law. 20 Three principal judgments of the Court of Justice set
forth the Community law approach to supremacy.2 '
The first case, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Ondernem-
ing van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen
("Van Gend & Loos"), decided that some Treaty provisions
can have direct effect in national law so that nationals and un-
dertakings may claim rights under the Treaty provisions in na-
tional courts.2 3 The Court of Justice in Van Gend & Loos as-
serted that the Treaty is more than an agreement that merely
creates mutual obligations between the Member States. 24 In-
stead, the Court of Justice noted that the Community consti-
tutes a "new legal order" in exchange for which the Member
States have limited their sovereignty.25 The Court of Justice
19. H. SCHERMERS & D. WAELBROECK, supra note 8, at I 11. According to Messrs.
Schermers and Waelbroeck, the jurisprudence of the Court ofJustice requires a mon-
ist view of the relationship between national law and Community. Id. They state that
[t]he Court ofJustice has repeatedly ruled that it considers the relationship
between national law and Community law to be monist. There can be no
transformation of Community law into national law. It must be of direct use
to Community citizens within their national legal orders, and in the case of a
conflict arising Community law must take priority over national law irrespec-
tive of the date when the latter legislation was adopted.
Id. According to Dr. Ami Barav, the Court ofJustice considers that the Community
and national legal orders have become a single and unified order in which Commu-
nity law is supreme. See Barav, Cour constitutionnelle italienne et droit communautaire: le
fant6me de Simmenthal, 21 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPiEN, 313, 330 (1985).
Dr. Barav comments that
[plour la Cour de justice, les ordres juridiques communautaire et national
fusionnent pour constituer un ordre unitaire i l'int6rieur duquel les normes
communautaires pr6servent leurs caract~res propres, dont la primaut6 sur
le droit interne.
Id.
20. See Barav, supra note 19, at 330.
21. See H. SCHERMERS & D. WAELBROECK, supra note 8, at 111-15 (discussing Van
Gend & Loos, Costa, and Simmenthal II).
22. Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008.
23. Id. at 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008, at 7215. The obligations and
rights conferred by Community law are not limited to those expressly enumerated in
the Treaty. Id. at 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008, at 7214. "These rights arise
not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obliga-
tions which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as
upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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held that Community law imposes obligations and rights on
individuals that become part of their legal heritage independ-
ent of the legislation of each Member State.2 6 .
The second landmark judgment that defines the EEC view
of the supremacy of Community law is Costa v. ENEL. 27 Costa
involved an alleged conflict between certain Treaty Articles
and a subsequent Italian law nationalizing an electrical util-
ity.2 ' The question before the Court of Justice was whether
Community law entitled individual claimants to rely on the
Treaty articles in the national courts as against subsequent na-
tional laws. 29 The Court ofJustice once again emphasized that
the Treaty created its own legal system that became an integral
part of the legal systems of the Member States."0 The Court of
Justice held that Community law cannot be called into question
by subsequent national legislation."' Community law is an in-
26. Id.
27. Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023.
28. Id. at 588, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023, at 7387.
29. Id. at 594, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023, at 7390-91.
30. Id. at 593, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023, at 7390. The Costa Court
suggested that unlike ordinary international treaties, the Community is an emergent
polity. See id. The Court of Justice stated that
[b]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institu-
tions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representa-
tion on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stem-
ming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States
to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights,
albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds
both their nationals and themselves.
Id.
31. Id. at 593-94, Common Mkt. Rep. 8023, at 7390-91. The Costa judgment
suggested that it is Community law that defines the valid scope and activities of na-
tional law. See id. The Court of Justice stated that
[w]herever the Treaty grants the States the right to act unilaterally, it does
this by clear and precise provisions (for example Articles 15, 93(3), 223, 224
and 225). Applications, by Member States for authority to derogate from
the Treaty are subject to a special authorization procedure (for example Ar-
ticles 8(4), 17(4), 25, 26, 73, the third subparagraph of Article 93(2), and
226) which would lose their purpose if the Member States could renounce
their obligations by means of an ordinary law.
The precedence of community law is confirmed by Article 189, whereby
a regulation 'shall be binding' and 'directly applicable in all Member
States'. . . . The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to
the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights,
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of
the Community cannot prevail. Consequently Article 177 is to be applied
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dependent source of law, the Court of Justice observed, with a
"special and original nature" that cannot be overridden by do-
mestic law without infringing the legal basis of the Community
itself.32
The third seminal judgment defining the supremacy of
Community law is Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Sim-
menthal S.p.A. ("Simmenthal II"). 3 In Simmenthal H, an Italian
importer contested an Italian law mandating veterinary and
public health inspections and fees as contrary to the free move-
ment of goods under Community law.34 The issue before the
Court of Justice concerned the possible conflict between Com-
munity rules on the common organization of the bovine mar-
ket and the subsequent Italian veterinary and public health
law.35 The Court of Justice examined the Italian Constitu-
tional Court's rule requiring a trial court to inquire of the Ital-
ian Constitutional Court as to the existence of any alleged con-
flict between an EEC rule and a national statute and its mode
of resolution. 6 The Court of Justice held the Italian Constitu-
tional Court's procedural rule incompatible with Community
law. The Court of Justice noted that upon its entry into
force, Community law renders "automatically inapplicable"
any conflicting provisions of present national law. 8 The Court
of Justice added that Community law also precludes the "valid
adoption" of any future conflicting national law. 9 This obli-
gation requires, if need be, that every national court refuse "of
its own motion" to apply any prior or subsequent conflicting
national provisions.40 Consequently, the Court of Justice con-
regardless of any domestic law, whenever questions relating to the interpre-
tation of the Treaty arise.
Id. at 594.
32. Id.
33. Case 106/77, 1978 E.C.R. 629, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476. Com-
munity law includes the proposition that national courts possess Community-con-
ferred authority in addition to their national authority. See id. at 644, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8476, at 8610.
34. Id. at 631, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476, at 8602.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 641-42, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476, at 8609.
37. Id. at 645-46, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476, at 8610-11.
38. Id. at 643, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476, at 8610.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 644, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476, at 8611. The Court in Sim-
menthal H said that
1990-1991] FACTORTAME
cluded that every national court must apply Community law in
its entirety and effectively protect rights conferred by Commu-
nity law.4
The Court ofJustice's view is that the constitutional law of
each Member State cannot independently determine the hier-
archy and effect of Community law in each domestic legal or-
[a] national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to
apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to
those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any con-
flicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and
it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of
such provisions by legislative or other constitutional means.
Id.
41. Id. In Simmenthal H, the Court of Justice considered the Italian Constitu-
tional Court's intermediate position to be a procedural bottleneck impeding the ef-
fective application of Community law. La Pergola & Del Duca, Community Law, Inter-
national Law, and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 612 (1985). The Italian
Constitutional Court subsequently accepted the priority of EEC law over both prior
and subsequent national laws without the need for resort to centralized constitutional
review. See S.p.A. Granital v. Amministrazione Finanziaria dello Stato, [1984] I Giur.
Ital. 1521 (Corte cost. 1984); B.E.C.A. S.p.A. v. Amministrazione Finanziaria dello
Stato, [1985] I Giur. Cost. 694 (Corte cost. 1985). Despite this recognition by the
Italian courts of the direct protection of EEC rights, Italy and the EEC continue to
differ as to the theories justifying this conclusion. See La Pergola & Del Duca, supra at
615. Messrs. La Pergola and Del Duca write that
[t]he Community Court's notion of a permanent cession of sovereignty is a
monist theory, whereas the Constitutional Court's theory is a dualist one.
The Constitutional Court maintains that Italian law and Community law are
two separate legal orders. Italy applies Community law because the Consti-
tutional Court interprets Italian constitutional principles as indicating that
the Italian legal order chooses not to impede the application of Community
law, not because Italian law is subordinate to Community law as maintained
by the Court of Justice.
Id.; see Darmon, Juridictions constitutionnelles et droit communautaire, 24 REVUE TRIMES-
TRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPfEN, 217, 225 (1988); Petriccione, Italy: Supremacy of Commu-
nity Law Over National Law, 11 EUR. L. REV. 320 (1986). Professor Petriccione ob-
serves that
[w]ith its decision in B.E.C.A. the Italian Constitutional Court has indeed
confirmed once more its willingness to ensure supremacy of Community law
in Italy, and to contribute to its equal and uniform application in all Member
States. As a last remark, one might ask if the fear is really justified that the
peculiar line of reasoning followed by the Constitutional Court may lead to
further conflicts with the European Court. On the contrary, the 'dualist'
approach taken by the Constitutional Court, even though in sharp contrast
with the "monist" view adopted by the European Court seems equally effec-
tive in achieving results consistent with a Member State's obligations under
the Treaty.
Id. at 327.
785
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der.42 The Court of Justice's jurisprudence has condemned a
dualist approach to the supremacy of Community law without
explicitly endorsing a monist conception.43 As Van Gend & Loos
and Costa suggested, the Community treaties (the "Treaties") 44
possess a constitutive character entirely different from ordi-
42. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle f'tir
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8126, 7424. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the Court ofJustice asserted
the supremacy of Community law over the constitutional law of the Member States.
Id. The Court ofJustice stated that
the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot
because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and with-
out the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.
Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Mem-
ber State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fun-
damental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the princi-
ples of a national constitutional structure.
Id.; see Contantinesco, La spicificit du droit communautaire, 2 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT EUROPCEN 1, 16 (1966) (stating: "[I]a solution correcte de ce problme ne
peut tre trouve qu'en partant d'un point de vue communautaire").
43. See Barav, supra note 19, at 327-28. Dr. Barav notes that
la Cour de justice condamne, certes, toute manifestation d'un dualisme or-
ganique et procedural mais ... elle n'aflirme pas pour autant un monisme
juridictionnel. [Professeur Kovar] considre que ce qui est 6xig6 du juge
national nest que la cons6cration proc6durale des rapports normatifs entre
les ordres juridiques communautaire et national. Dans certains cas,
l'imm~diatet6 normative implique une reduction de ia marge de l'autonomie
institutionnelle. "Cette marge" conclut le Professeur R. Kovar, "tend se
r~duire au titre A exercer la competence nationale communautairement
definie dans son exercise."
Id. at 327-28 (quoting Kovar, Rapports entre le droit communautaire et les droits nationaux,
in COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTIS EUROPIENNES, TRENTE ANS DE DROIT COM-
MUNAUTAIRE, 115, 157 (1981)). Dr. Barav believes that since the Simmenthal H/judg-
ment, the primacy and direct effect of Community law precludes the valid adoption of
new but inconsistent national laws. Id. at 324. Dr. Barav notes that the subsequent
inconsistent national law is stricken with an "inherent defect." Id. Dr. Barav writes:
[la Cour] fait donc une distinction entre la loi ant~rieure qui, elle, devient
inapplicable, et la loi post&ieure qui, en revanche, est emp&che d'etre val-
ablement form~e. Cest parce qu'elle est entache d'un vice inn6
d'incomptence que la loi postrieure ne saurait tre valablement forme.
Selon la Cour, la validit6, meme provisoire, d'une loi intervenant dans le
domaine relevant de la competence communautaire, mettrait en question
les bases m~mes de la Communaut&
Id.; see Van Der Meersch, L'arrt d 9 mars 1978 de la Cour deJustice des Communauts
Europienes et la rigle de l'application directe du droit communautaire dans le droit interne des tats
membres, 55 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPAR9 24, 38-39 & n.55
(1978) (noting superior hierarchical position of Community law vis-d-vis national law
implied by Simmenthal II).
44. See supra note 2 (discussing treaties forming three European Communities).
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nary international treaties.45 The Treaties are not merely a set
of reciprocal obligations between the Community and each of
the Member States, but a new legal order for the benefit of
which the Member States have limited their sovereignty.46 The
Treaties create a relationship among the Member States that is
collective and interdependent, and not merely bilateral and di-
visible.47
As a result, the position and effects of Community law in
each Member State must be the same as the position and ef-
fects of Community law in the legal orders of each of the other
Member States.4" As a body of unitary law,49 Community law
must have the same effect and rank at the same time through-
out the Community. 0 If Community law is to preserve its
communal character, the relation of Community law to na-
tional law, including constitutional law, must be determined by
Community law. 5' This implies that in the event of a conflict
between the Treaties and a Member State's constitution, the
Member State would be obliged to modify or amend its consti-
tution."
45. See Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8023, at 7390; NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, 1963
E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008; see also Contantinesco, supra note 42, at
8-9 (discussing unique constitutive character of Community treaties).
46. See Contantinesco, supra note 42, at 14-15.
47. See id. at 15.
48. Id.
49. See Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the
European Community, 34 AM. J. OF CoMP. L. 229, 247 (1986) (noting that Community
has already acquired many federal features).
50. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case
106/77, 1978 E.C.R. 629, 634- 44, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476, 8610; see also
Contantinesco, supra note 42, at 15. As Contantinesco observes, "[e]n effet, le
principe de 1'6galit6 des Etats membres serait 16s6 et le droit communautaire perdrait
son caractire communautaire et unitaire si ses effets variaient d'un Etat membre A
l'autre, selon leur volont6." Id.
51. Contantinesco, supra note 42, at 16.
52. Id. at 21. According to Professor Contantinesco,
[I]a conclusion, pour ce qui est de notre hypothise, est que l'Etat membre
qui constate, des ann6es apr~s la ratification des trait~s, une contradiction
entre ceux-ci et sa propre Constitution, ne doit plus pouvoir mettre en
doute la validit6 du trait6, mais au contraire, devra modifier sa Constitution,
pour la mettre en accord avec ses obligations internationales.
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B. The United Kingdom Approach to Supremacy
In Professor A.V. Dicey's classic formulation, the sover-
eignty of Parliament and the rule of law are the two fundamen-
tal features of the U.K. constitution." The U.K. doctrine of
the sovereignty of Parliament requires that U.K. courts enforce
clear expressions of Parliament's will. 54  As a result, U.K.
courts cannot question the "validity" of legislation.5 5 The
53. A.V. DICEY, supra note 11, at 39-85 & 183-205. According to Professor Di-
cey, the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the law of the land are the
two cardinal and mutually supporting principles of the U.K. constitution, Id. He
defined parliamentary sovereignty as meaning
neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament [defined as the
"Queen in Parliament" or the Monarch, the House of Lords, and the House
of Commons acting together] has, under the English constitution, the right
to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside
the legislation of Parliament.
Id. at 39-40. The second fundamental characteristic of the English constitution is the
rule or supremacy of law. Id. at 184. Once a political decision is taken to effect a
certain policy in the form of an act, the judiciary must fix the content and scope of the
new legislation. Id. at 413-14. Professor Dicey stated that
(t]he fact that the most arbitrary powers of the English executive must al-
ways be exercised under Act of Parliament places the government, even
when armed with the widest authority, under the supervision, so to speak, of
the courts. Powers, however extraordinary, which are conferred or sanc-
tioned by statute, are never really unlimited, for they are confined by the
words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the
statute by the judges. Parliament is supreme legislator, but from the mo-
ment Parliament has uttered its will as lawgiver, that will becomes subject to
the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the land, and the judges, who
are influenced by the feelings of magistrates no less than by the general
spirit of the common law, are disposed to construe statutory exceptions to
common law principles , . . in a spirit of legality.
Id.
54. See id. at 40.
55. See id. Professor Phillips states that constitutional orthodoxy requires, even
in the Community setting, that U.K. courts refrain from reviewing the validity of stat-
utes. Phillips, Has the "Incoming Tide" Reached the Palace of Westminster?, 95 L.Q.R. 167,
168-69 (1979). Professor Phillips notes that
[t]he concept of the 'supremacy' (in its wide sense) of Community law over
the legislatures of Member States may be accepted by the European Court
and by the constitutional laws of other Member States, but the dualist or
pluralist theory adopted by British constitutional law requires the courts of
the United Kingdom to look at Community law through the medium of Par-
liament. British courts do not apply Community law directly, but indirectly
in accordance with the authority conferred on them by the European Com-
munities Act. The expression 'supremacy of Community law,' if used in the
context of our domestic law, must refer to construction, not legislative
power; to judicial interpretation, not review of validity. The 'supremacy' of
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doctrine of the rule or supremacy of law, however, requires
that the actions of governmental and civil authorities be justi-
fied in law.56 The common law therefore protects individual
freedom by permitting governmental encroachment upon it
only where such infringement is clearly authorized by law.57
In the context of statutes, the rule of law requires that citi-
zens be bound by, and entitled to rely on, the law as it is ex-
pressed in the words of the statute.58  This means that the
courts do not seek to apply what Parliament meant, rather they
seek the true meaning of what Parliament said.5" In seeking
the true meaning, courts will interpret any ambiguous lan-
guage in favor of the liberty of the citizen and common law
Community law in this sense applies, not as is often said, so long as the
United Kingdom remains a Member of the Community, but so long as the
European Communities Act in substantially its present form remains in
force. From the proposition that certain rights created by the Treaty and
Community Regulations are enforceable by individuals in national courts
without further enactment by national legislation, which is recognised by
section 2(1) of the European Communities Act, it does not follow that a
national legislature cannot constitutionally enact later statutes conflicting
with such rights; nor does section 2(4) of the Act purport to restrict-even if
it could effectively do so--the power of Parliament after 1972 to legislate
contrary to Community law.
Id. (emphasis added); see T. HARTLEY, supra note 8, at 244- 45; Phillips, High Tide in the
Strand? Post-1972 Acts and Community Law, 96 L.Q.R. 31 (1980); Allan, Parliamentary
Sovereignty and the EEC, PUB. L. 562 (1982).
56. See Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutional-
ism, 44(1) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111, 117 (1985). The doctrine of the rule of law has three
meanings. A.V. DICEY, supra note 11, at 202-03. First, it means the absolute
supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary law. Id. at 202. Professor Dicey writes
that "Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be
punished for a breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else." Id. Second,
it means the equality of government officials and ordinary citizens before the ordi-
nary common law courts. Id. Third, the rule of law expresses the fact that in the
United Kingdom, a nation with no written constitution, constitutional law is the "re-
sult ofjudicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases
brought before the courts." Id. at 195.
57. See Allan, supra note 56, at 116. As Professor Allan notes, "[t]he residual na-
ture of the freedoms protected by the common law is reflected in Dicey's insistence
that they were derived, not from a constitutional code of enacted rights, but from the
particular cases in which officials had asserted their authority to act." Id.
58. Id. at 117.
59. Black-Clawson Int'l Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G.,
[1975] A.C. 591, 613G; see Allan, supra note 56, at 118. Lord Reid stated in Black-
Clawson that judges "often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but
that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parlia-
ment used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what
they said." BlacA-Clawson, [1975] A.C. at 613G.
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principles. 60 The rule of law thus qualifies the will of Parlia-
ment because courts, absent a distinct and clear enactment,
will presume Parliament did not intend to violate rules of com-
mon and international law.6 l
In the United Kingdom, international treaties can only af-
fect existing domestic law if the treaties are specifically incor-
porated into domestic law by an act of Parliament.6" In Black-
burn v. Attorney-General,63 Mr. Blackburn sought declarations
60. Allan, supra note 56, at 119. In the words of one commentator, the rule of
law is a principle of "institutional morality" which U.K. courts employ against execu-
tive action in two ways. Jowell, The Rule of Law Today, in THE CHANGING CONSTITU-
TION 19 (J.Jowell & D. Oliver eds. 1989). First, as guardians of Parliament's purpose,
they set aside decisions or actions that are beyond the powers conferred by the appli-
cable statute. Id. Second, courts supply the "omission of the legislature" if the stat-
ute is silent on a point and insist on procedural legality. Id. Professor Allan explains
that
[als a guiding principle of interpretation, the rule of law provides a natural
and powerful means for the expression of our constitutional attachment to
the freedom of the individual. Its scope is reflected in the "well-known gen-
eral principle that statutes which encroach upon the rights of the subject,
whether as regards person or property, are subject to a strict construction."
The court is bound to give effect to the clearly expressed intentions of Par-
liament, but "where the import of some enactment is inconclusive or ambig-
uous, the court may properly lean in favour of an interpretation that leaves
private rights undisturbed."
Allan, supra note 56, at 121 (quoting Attorney-General for Canada v. Halley and Ca-
rey Ltd., [1952] A.C. 472, 450 (Lord Radcliffe)).
61. See A.V. DICEY, supra note 11, at 202-03 (noting three elements of doctrine
of rule of law). As Professor Allan notes, the judicial interpretation of statutes ensures
that in the statutes' application political morality will be respected. Allan, supra note
56, at 130. He notes that because the judge
is bound to administer justice according to law, including legislation of which
he may disapprove, he must faithfully accord every Act of Parliament its full
and proper application. But in administeringjustice according to law he can
hardly be indifferent to the expectations and aspirations of the governed-
those from whom, in our political theory, all governmental authority is ulti-
mately derived. Hence the importance of those presumptions of legislative
intent which operate to exclude harsh and retrospective changes in the law
in the absence of clear and unambiguous enactment. The rule of law there-
fore assists in preventing the subversion of the political sovereignty of the
people by manipulation of the legal sovereignty of Parliament.
Id. (emphasis in original).
62. See Blackburn v. Attorney-General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380, 1382, [1971] 1
W.L.R. 1037, 1039-40 (C.A.). In Blackburn, Lord Denning stated that "[e]ven if a
treaty is signed, it is elementary that these courts take no notice of treaties as such.
We take no notice of treaties until they are embodied in laws enacted by Parliament,
and then only to the extent that Parliament tells us." Id.; see L. COLLINS, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 24-25 (4th ed. 1990).
63. [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380.
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that upon signing the EEC Treaty, the U.K. government would
violate U.K. law because the government thereby would sur-
render part of the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament.
Lord Denning, noting the Costa judgment, accepted that U.K.
accession to the EEC would limit the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. 64 Lord Denning noted, however, that negotiations
to sign the EEC Treaty were still under way, and that even if
the Treaty were signed, U.K. courts only take notice of treaties
to the extent they are embodied in acts of Parliament.65 Mr.
Blackburn also claimed that in the event Parliament did enact
implementing legislation, in doing so Parliament would con-
travene the legal rule that no Parliament can bind its succes-
sors.66 On this point, Lord Denning agreed that it was settled
legal doctrine that one Parliament cannot bind another and
that no act is irreversible.67 Observing, however, that "legal
theory must give way to practical politics,"6 Lord Denning
dismissed this point on the ground that the court would not
address the question of Parliament's power to revoke any
eventual implementing legislation unless and until that un-
likely event occurred.69
Parliament gave legal effect to Community law in the
United Kingdom when it enacted the European Communities
Act 1972.70 The European Communities Act 1972 provides
that all acts of Parliament and subordinate legislation, passed
or to be passed in the future, shall be construed and effective
subject to Community law.71 Under section 3(1), U.K. courts
64. Id. at 1381.
65. Id. at 1382.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1383.
70. European Communities Act 1972, ch. 68.
71. Id., ch. 68, § 2(1); see L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 28. Section 2(1) of the
European Communities Act 1972 provides that
[a]ll such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to
time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and
procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in
accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal
effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in
law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression
'enforceable Community right' and similar expressions shall be read as re-
ferring to one to which this subsection applies.
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must defer to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in all
legal proceedings in which questions as to the meaning or ef-
fect of Community law arise. 72
The traditional view of the European Communities Act
1972 is that it embodies a rule of construction. 73 The effect of
this rule is that U.K. courts should interpret subsequent legis-
lation, if at all possible, consistently with Community law and
read subsequent and inadvertently inconsistent legislation as
subject to Community law.7 ' This rule preserves the ultimate
sovereignty of Parliament, however, because the European
Communities Act 1972 does not state expressly that Parlia-
ment cannot repeal the European Communities Act 1972 or
pass legislation deliberately contravening Community law.75
The European Communities Act 1972 requires, and judi-
cial opinions confirm,7 6 that U.K. courts must give Community
European Communities Act 1972, ch. 68, § 2(1). Section 2(4) of the Act provides
that
[t]he provision that may be made under subsection (2) above includes, sub-
ject to Schedule 2 to this act, any such provision (or any such extent) as
might be made by act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be
passed, other than one contained in this Part of this act, shall be construed
and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section; but, ex-
cept as may be provided by any act passed after this act, Schedule 2 shall
have effect in connection with the powers conferred by this and the follow-
ing sections of this act to make Orders in Council and regulations.
Id. § 2(4).
72. European Communities Act 1972, ch. 68, § 3(1). Section 3(1) of the Act
provides that
[flor the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or
effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any
Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not
referred to the Court ofJustice, be for determination as such in accordance
with the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of the Court of
Justice [or any court attached thereto]).
Id.
73. See L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 28.
74. See id. at 28-29.
75. See id. at 28.
76. See, e.g., Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
[1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 10 (H.L.); Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and Eng'g Co., [1989] 1 All
E.R. 1134, 1140 (H.L.); Duke v. G.E.C. Reliance Ltd., [1988] 1 A.C. 618, 623 (H.L.);
Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 43, 49-50 (H.L.);
Garland v. British Rail Eng'g Ltd., [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 174, 178 (H.L.); Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Henn & Darby, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 229, 233-34 (H.L.); Shields
v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., [1979] 1 All E.R. 456, 460-61 (C.A.); Macarthys Ltd. v.
Smith, [1981] I All E.R. Ill (C.A.).
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law precedence over existing and subsequent national law."'
The traditional U.K. view, however, holds that Community law
is applicable in the United Kingdom only because the Euro-
pean Communities Act 1972 incorporates Community law into
domestic law.78 Consequently, according to the traditional
view, U.K. courts consider Community law to be a part of U.K.
law that, pursuant to the European Communities Act 1972,
overrides any other part of U.K. law that is inconsistent with
it.
7 9
U.K. courts interpret section 2(4) of the European Com-
munities Act 1972 as a'rule of construction that requires na-
tional legislation, including acts of Parliament, to be construed
consistently with directly effective Community law.8 ° This rule
presumes the intention of Parliament not to legislate deliber-
ately contrary to Community law.8 ' Consequently, this inter-
pretative approach prevents only the implied repeal of Com-
77. European Communities Act 1972, ch. 68, §§ 2(1) & 2(4); see supra note 71
and accompanying text (setting forth relevant provisions of European Communities
Act 1972).
78. L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 39-40.
79. Macarthys Ltd', [1981] 1 All E.R. at 121.
80. Garland, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 178; see L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 28. In
Garland, Lord Diplock said before the House of Lords that
it is a principle of construction of United Kingdom statutes, now too well
established to call for citation of authority, that the words of a statute passed
after the Treaty has been signed and dealing with the subject-matter of the
international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be construed, if they
are reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out
the obligation and not to be inconsistent with it. A fortiori is this the case
where the Treaty obligation arises under one of the Community Treaties to
which section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 applies.
Garland, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 178. Professor Collins notes that
[iut has been suggested that s2(4) has effected a degree of entrenchment by
denying effectiveness to subsequent legislation inconsistent with Commu-
nity law. But it is submitted that the better view is that, in so far as it relates
to future legislation, s2(4) only expresses a rule of construction which must
give way to a contrary intention.
L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 28 (footnote omitted); see Forman, The European Comm-
munities Act 1972: The Government's Position on the Meaning and Effect of its Constitutional
Provisions, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 39, 52 (noting that when Parliament debated
provisions of European Communities Act 1972 it was widely accepted that future
Parliament retained right to expressly exclude or override Community obligations).
81. See Forman, supra note 80, at 52 (noting that in event of "inadvertent conflict
between Community and national law, the Government suggested that the courts
would try 'in accordance with the traditional approach' to interpret that statute" according
to U.K international obligations (emphasis in original)).
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munity rights, because in principle Parliament retains the
power to amend or repeal deliberately the European Commu-
nities Act 1972.82
The classic expression of the interpretative approach to
the application of Community law in the United Kingdom is
that of Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith.83 Macarthys Ltd.
involved a possible conflict between Community equal pay
provisions and subsequent U.K. equal pay legislation.84 Lord
Denning observed that as a result of sections 2(1) and 2(4) of
82. L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 39. According to Professor Collins the rela-
tionship ofCommunity law and U.K. law is regulated by U.K. law. Id. at 39-41. He
argues that
at present, whatever may be the position in the future, the correct position
in United Kingdom constitutional law is the orthodox one, that the courts
must and will give effect to subsequent United Kingdom legislation, even if
it is inconsistent with Community law, subject to the important rule of con-
struction in s 2(4). If the United Kingdom remains in the European Com-
munities, it will be under an obligation to repeal such legislation, but its
judges will not be able to declare the legislation inapplicable unless they are
satisfied that there is no intention to depart from the principles established
by s 2(1) and s 2(4) of the 1972 Act. There will therefore be a breach of the
principle in the Simmenthal case, that a national court should not have to
await the repeal of inconsistent legislation before giving full effect to Com-
munity law .... The decisions and writings in the other member states,
although of great interest with regard to Community law, cannot without
considerable reservation be treated as even of persuasive authority in rela-
tion to the problem of the relationship of Community law and national law
at the national level in the United Kingdom. This is a matter not primarily of
Community law, but of constitutional law.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). According to Messrs. Kapteyn and Van
Themaat, however, the relationship of Community and national law is a matter regu-
lated by Community law. P.J.G. KAPrEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, supra note 3, at 350.
They maintain that
[t]he principle of the priority of Community law is a principle of Community
law itself. Thus it is Community law and not national law which decrees
such priority. Thus, for example, a Dutch judge, in the event of a conflict
with rules of Community law, would refuse to apply the relevant national
provisions not on account of incompatibility with Article 94 of the Dutch
Constitution but on account of their incompatibility with Community law.
In the United Kingdom whilst the European Communities Act 1972 was the
vehicle for the entry of Community law into the national legal systems, the
priority which Community law has occurs by virtue of Community law.
Id.; see Mitchell, What Happened to the Constitution on 1st January 1973?, 11 CAMBRIAN L.
REV. 69, 76 (1980) (arguing that source of U.K. solidarity to Community law is Com-
munity legal order itself and not European Communities Act 1972).
83. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1189, [1979] 3 All E.R. 325 (C.A.), Article 177 referral, Case
129/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1275, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8653, on remand, [1981] 1
All E.R. 111 (C.A.).
84. [1979] 3 All E.R. 325, 328 (C.A.).
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the European Communities Act 1972, U.K. courts were bound
to apply the directly effective Community rule. 5 Lord Den-
ning conceded that if U.K. legislation is unintentionally "defi-
cient" or inconsistent with Community law, U.K. courts must
give effect to the latter.8 6 As one commentator observes, Com-
munity law can supplement a deficiency or inconsistency in
U.K. law.8 7 Lord Denning added in dictum, however, that if
Parliament deliberately passes an act with the clear intention of
repudiating the Treaty or any Community provision, then U.K.
courts must abide by the conflicting parliamentary statute.8
The Court of Appeal perceived a possible conflict between
the domestic legislation and the relevant Community provi-
sions, and accordingly made a reference under Article 177 to
the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the applicable
Community law.8 9 In its preliminary ruling in Macarthys Ltd. v.
Smith,90 the Court of Justice held that the Community law pro-
vision applied.9 ' When the case returned to the Court of Ap-
peal on the question of costs, Lord Denning reiterated that the
Treaty provisions take priority over any inconsistent domestic
equal pay rules.92 He accepted that Community law is part of
U.K. law, and that in the event of any inconsistency, Commu-
nity law takes priority. 93 Lord Denning stressed, however, that
the priority of Community law is "given" Gy the European
85. Id. at 329.
86. Id. Lord Denning stated that
[iun construing our statute, we are entitled to look to the Treaty as an aid to
its construction; but not only as an aid but as an overriding force. If on
close investigation it should appear that our legislation is deficient or is in-
consistent with Community law by some oversight of our draftsmen then it
is our bounden duty to give priority to Community law. Such is the result of
s2(l) and (4) of the European Communities Act 1972.
Id.
87. L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 33.
88. Macarthys Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 329. Lord Denning cautioned, "I do not how-
ever envisage any such situation. As I said in Blackburn v. Attorney-General: '[b]ut, if
Parliament should do so, then I say we will consider that event when it happens.'
Unless there is such an intentional and express repudiation of the Treaty, it is our
duty to give priority to the Treaty." Id. (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 331.
90. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, Case 129/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1275, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8653.
91. Id. at 1290-91, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8653, at 7744.
92. Macarthy's Ltd. v. Smith, [1981] 1 All E.R. at 120 (C.A.).
93. Id.
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Communities Act 1972 itself.9 4
There is thus no constitutional limitation on the power of
Parliament to override, at the domestic level, the Treaty obli-
gations of the Crown.95 As long as the United Kingdom re-
mains a member of the Community, however, there is a pre-
sumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary
to these EEC obligations.9 6 As a result, if a certain piece of
legislation is ambiguous, and one of the possible meanings is
consistent with a Treaty obligation and the other is not, U.K.
courts will prefer the meaning that is compatible. 97 U.K.
94. Id. Messrs. Kapteyn and Van Themaat take issue with Lord Denning's view
of the supremacy of Community law, stating that
[w]ith respect to the learned Master of the Rolls his observation appears to
confuse two points. The priority of Community law is a principle of that
law; that law (including the principle) is recognised by the European Com-
munities Act 1972 but is not (as such) given by the Act. The substitution of
the word 'recognised' for the word 'given' would have rendered the learned
Master of the Rolls' remarks unobjectionable.
PJ.G. KAPTEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, supra note 3, at 350 n.397; see Gormley, The Appli-
cation of Community Law in the United Kingdom, 1976-1985, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
287 (1986). Professor Gormley stated that
[t]he decision of the Court of Appeal applying the preliminary ruling in
Case 129/79 Macarthy's Ltd. v. Smith showed that, unless the European Com-
munities Act 1972 is amended, it should be possible for courts in the United
Kingdom to give full effect to the principle of the supremacy of Community
law. An unsatisfactory (though unsurprising) feature of the judgment was
that the basis for the principle of supremacy was found not in Community
law itself but in the force of the 1972 Act.
Id. at 307 (footnotes omitted).
95. L. COLLINS, supra note 62, at 42.
96. Id. Professor Collins observes that
[wihether the United Kingdom courts will come to accept, as the courts of
the other member states have come to accept, the full implications of the
supremacy of Community law remains open. They have certainly not yet
accepted them, and the indications are that the orthodox view of Parliamen-
tary supremacy will prevail for some time to come.
Id.
97. Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and Eng'g Co., 1 All E.R. 1134, 1140 (1989). Lord
Oliver said that
[i]f the legislation can reasonably be construed so as to conform with
[Treaty] obligations, obligations which are to be ascertained not only from
the wording of the relevant directive but from the interpretation placed on it
by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, such a purposive con-
struction will be applied even though, perhaps, it may involve some depar-
ture from the strict and literal application of the words which the legislature
has elected to use.
Id. Professor Allan observed that
[t]he result, however, is an interesting recognition by the courts of a special
FACTORTAME
courts therefore, will interpret the parliamentary act as being
compatible or consistent with Community law. This interpre-
tative method, effectuated by the European Communities Act
1972, operates as a veil that insulates the "validity" of acts of
Parliament from judicial review while ensuring that directly ef-
fective Community law is applied in the United Kingdom.
II. REGINA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
TRANSPORT, EX PARTE FACTORTAME LTD.
A. Factual Background
The appellants in Factortame brought suit to enjoin the ap-
plication of an act of Parliament preventing them from fishing
against the U.K. fishing quota.98 The appellants included a
number of companies incorporated under the laws of the
United Kingdom. 99 The directors and shareholders of those
companies, most of whom were Spanish nationals, owned or
managed ninety-five fishing vessels that were registered as
British fishing vessels under the Merchant Shipping Act
1894.100 As a result, these companies operated mainly from
Spanish ports and landed most of their catches in Spain both
before and after Spain's accession to the EEC in 1985.101 This
system of registration under the 1894 Act allowed the appel-
lants to fish against the U.K. quotas under the EEC Common
Fisheries Policy, and elude the restrictions placed on Spanish
fishing interests under the EEC-Spain Fisheries Agreement of
requirement of form for legislation of a certain type. In other words, section
2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972, providing for the recognition
of directly applicable Community law as part of English law, has been en-
trenched by the stipulation in section 2(4) that 'any enactment passed or to
be passed . . . shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing
provisions of this section.' Maugham L.J.'s dictum in Ellen Street Estates v.
Minister of Health that 'the legislature cannot, according to our constitution,
bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation' must now be treated as
subject to that (limited) qualification.
Allan, supra note 55, at 564 (citation omitted).
98. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., (1989]
2 C.M.L.R. 353, 357-60 (Div. Ct.).
99. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame, Case C-213/
89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. [1990] CEC 189, 190.
100. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 60.
101. See Factortame, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 367.
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1980 and the Iberian Act of Accession of 1985.102
In 1988, Parliament radically altered the statutory scheme
governing the registration of British fishing vessels in the
Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (the "1988 Act")'0 3 and the
Merchant Shipping Regulations 1988.104 The objective of the
new legislation was to stop this practice, known as "quota hop-
ping," whereby the U.K. fishing quotas were "plundered" by
vessels that flew the British flag or were registered in the
United Kingdom yet lacked any genuine link with the United
Kingdom. 1 5 The 1988 Act directed that a fishing vessel only
could be registered as British if the vessel was British-owned
and managed and its operations were directed from within the
United Kingdom. 'O6 Under the new legislation, the appellants
would lose their existing registration and licenses and be
forced out of business.'0 7 In December 1988, the appellants
challenged the 1988 legislation on the ground that it infringed
102. See Churchill, Quota Hopping: The Common Fisheries Policy Wrongfooted?, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 209, 210-12 (1990).
103. Merchant Shipping Act 1988, ch. 12.
104. Merchant Shipping Regulations 1988 _; Factortame, Case C-213/89, 1989
E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. [1990] 2 CEC at 190-91.
105. Id. at 191.
106. Factortame, Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. [1990] 2
CEC at 191. As summarized in the Report for the Hearing of the Court of Justice,
the conditions laid down in section 14 of the 1988 Act that must be fulfilled cumula-
tively are as follows:
a) Nationality
The legal title to the vessel must be vested wholly in qualified British
citizens or companies.
At least 75% of the beneficial ownership of the vessel must be vested in
qualified British citizens or companies.
A company is "qualified" if it is incorporated in the UK and has its prin-
cipal place of business there, and if at least 75 per cent of its shares are held
by legal owners and beneficial owners who are British citizens. Further-
more, at least 75 per cent of its directors must be British citizens.
The figure of 75 per cent may be raised provisionally to 100 per cent
pursuant to regulations adopted under the 1988 Act. The UK has not yet
availed itself of this possibility.
That nationality requirement also applies to a charterer or operator of
the vessel, whether he be a natural person or a company.
b) Residence and Domicile
This is a further requirement along with nationality.
c) Direction and Control
The vessel must be managed, and its operations directed and con-
trolled, from the UK.
107. Id.
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various directly effective Community rights including those re-
lating to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of na-
tionality and the freedom of establishment of companies.'0°
B. Procedural Background
In addition to the challenge of the 1988 legislation, the
appellants applied for a grant of interim relief pending a final
determination of the issues.' 0 9 The Divisional Court of the
Queen's Bench Division sought a preliminary ruling from the
Court of Justice on the question of the substantive extent of
the claimed EEC rights."t 0 The Divisional Court granted in-
terim relief and disapplied the 1988 Act because it might take
months or years for the Court of Justice response to be
given."' The Divisional Court restrained the Secretary of
State from enforcing the 1988 Act, and allowed the appellants
to fish as British vessels under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894
pending the final determination of their rights under Commu-
nity law." 2 In his concurrence, Judge Hodgson observed that
a court that has jurisdiction to make a final, order disapplying
the provision of a U.K. statute should also have jurisdiction to
make an interim order to the same temporary effect.' 3
In March 1989, the Secretary of State appealed from the
Divisional Court's injunctive order, and the Court of Appeal
108. Id. The appellants relied upon EEC Treaty Articles 7 (prohibiting discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality), 52 (freedom of establishment of nationals of Mem-
ber State in territory of another Member State), 58 (freedom of establishment of
companies of Member State in territory of another Member State) and 221 (requiring
equality of treatment as regards participation in the capital of companies). See Regina
v. Secretary of State ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 353, 362 (Div. Ct.).
109. Regina v. Secretary of State ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case C-213/89, 1989
E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. [1990] 2 CEC 189, 191.
110. See id; see also Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte
Factortame, Ltd., Case C-221/89, action brought July 17, 1989 (judgment not yet
delivered).
111. Factortame, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 384 (Div. Ct.).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 381. Judge Hodgson said that
[iun any case I find it difficult to believe that a court which has jurisdiction to
make a final order disapplying the provisions of an English statute does not
also have jurisdiction in a proper case to make an interim order to the same
temporary effect. If the court is not constrained by authority, and I believe
it is not, it seems to me clear that to deny the court the power to make an
interim order would be wrong.
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held that the Divisional Court did not have the power to disap-
ply an act of Parliament." 4 The Court of Appeal noted that
prior to accession to the Community, U.K. courts had no juris-
diction to dispense with the operation of a statute." 5 Further-
more, the Court of Appeal believed that there was no express
or implied principle-in the Treaty, in the European Commu-
nities Act 1972, or in the jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice-empowering a national court to override national law in
favor of alleged but not yet finally determined Community
rights." 16 The Court of Appeal conceded that if the Court of
Justice upheld the appellants' claimed Community rights,
those rights would prevail over the restrictions of the 1988 Act,
and subsequently the Divisional Court would be obliged to en-
force those rights.' '7 The Court of Appeal stressed, however,
that unless and until the Court of Justice established that the
U.K. statute was incompatible with Community law, the statute
remained inviolable and could not be disapplied by the Divi-
sional Court.'18
The House of Lords, affirming the Court of Appeal, held
that under traditional U.K. common law concepts, U.K. courts
may not suspend the operation of a U.K. statute." 9 In addi-
tion, the Lords held that U.K. law does not permit U.K. courts
to issue interim injunctions against the Crown in either civil
proceedings or in proceedings on an application for judicial
review. 120
As for the application of Community law, the House of
Lords confirmed that under section 2(1) of the European Com-
munities Act 1972, directly enforceable Community rights
must be granted full recognition in the United Kingdom.'
2 1
The Lords also confirmed that under section 2(4) of the Euro-
pean Communities Act 1972, acts of Parliament passed subse-
quent to the European Communities Act 1972 must be con-
114. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1989]
2 C.M.L.R. 392, 407 (C.A.).
115. Id. at 404.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1989]
3 C.M.L.R. 1, 13-14 (H.L.).
120. Id. at 20-22.
121. Id. at 10.
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strued and enforced subject to directly enforceable Commu-
nity rights.1 22  The Lords observed that an act passed
subsequent to the European Communities Act 1972 must be
read as if a section were incorporated in the act which provided
that its provisions are consistent with directly enforceable EEC
rights. 121 Thus, said the Lords, if the appellants succeed in es-
tablishing the alleged EEC rights, these rights would prevail
over the restrictions of the subsequent act. 124
The House of Lords stressed, however, that if the dis-
puted U.K. statute is clear and self-executing, as was the 1988
Act, U.K. law requires that U.K. courts observe the presump-
tion that an act of Parliament is compatible with Community
law until it is declared incompatible by the Court of Justice. 125
122. Id. Lord Bridge said for the House of Lords that
[bly virtue of section 2(4) of the Act of 1972 Part II of the Act of 1988 is to
be construed and take effect subject to directly enforceable Community
rights and those rights are, by section 2(1) of the Act of 1972, to be
'recognised and available in law, and . .. enforced, allowed and followed
accordingly; . . .' This has precisely the same effect as if a section were in-
corporated in Part II of the Act of 1988 which in terms enacted that the
provisions with respect to registration of British fishing vessels were to be
without prejudice to the directly enforceable Community rights of nationals
of any member-State of the EEC. Thus it is common ground that, in so far
as the appellants succeed before the [Court ofJustice] in obtaining a ruling
in support of the Community rights which they claim, those rights will pre-
vail over the restrictions imposed on registration of British fishing vessels by
Part II of the Act of 1988 and the Divisional Court will, in the final determi-
nation of the application for judicial review, be obliged to make appropriate
declarations to give effect to those rights.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13. As Lord Bridge explained,
[i]n this situation the difficulty which confronts the appellants is that the
presumption that an Act of Parliament is compatible with Community law
unless and until declared to be incompatible must be at least as strong as the
presumption that delegated legislation is valid unless and until declared in-
valid. But an order granting the appellants the interim relief which they
seek will only serve their purpose if it declares that which Parliament has
enacted to be the law from 1 December 1988, and to take effect in relation
to vessels previously registered under the Act of 1894 from 31 March 1989,
not to be the law until some uncertain future date. Effective relief can only
be given if it requires the Secretary of State to treat the appellants' vessels as
entitled to registration under Part II of the Act in direct contravention of its
provisions. Any such order, unlike any form of order for interim relief
known to the law, would irreversibly determine in the appellants' favour for
a period of some two years rights which are necessarily uncertain until the
preliminary ruling of the [Court of Justice] has been given.
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The House of Lords noted that an order granting the re-
quested interim relief effectively would declare that which Par-
liament has enacted to be the law not to be the law pending the
Court of Justice's judgment. 126 The Lords viewed the pre-
sumption of validity which attaches to acts of Parliament as the
chief obstacle to the granting of interim protection. 12 7
Consequently, the House of Lords held that the appeal
must be dismissed unless there is an overriding principle of
Community law that compels national courts to assert the
power to provide interim relief for alleged but not yet finally
determined EEC rights. 128 The Lords decided that the appel-
lants erroneously relied on Court of Justice jurisprudence
which suggested that rules of national law hindering the exer-
cise of directly enforceable Community rights must be overrid-
den. ' 29 Nevertheless, the Lords agreed that Article 177 of the
Treaty required them to seek a preliminary ruling from the
Court of Justice to determine whether, in circumstances such
as these, Community law either empowers or requires a na-
tional court to make an interim order protecting claimed, but
not yet determined, directly effective rights. 30
Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 22-23. The Lords were persuaded by the U.K. Solicitor General,
who, in his analysis of the Court ofJustice's case law, argued that the Community law
propositions on which the appellants relied were inapposite. Id. The Solicitor Gen-
eral argued that the Community law rules on which the appellants relied were all
made by reference to rights which the Court ofiustice was itself then affirming, or by
reference to the protection of rights whose existence had already been established by
previous Court of Justice judgments. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 23-24. The House of Lords referred the following questions to the
Court of Justice:
1. Where-(i) a party before the national court claims to be entitled to
rights under Community law having direct effect in national law ('the rights
claimed'), (ii) a national measure in clear terms will, if applied, automatically
deprive that party of the rights claimed, (iii) there are serious arguments
both for and against the existence of the rights claimed and the national
court has sought a preliminary ruling under Article 177 as to whether or not
the rights claimed exist, (iv) the national law presumes the national measure
in question to be compatible with Community law unless and until it is de-
clared incompatible, (v) the national court has no power to give interim pro-
tection to the rights claimed by suspending the application of the national
measure pending the preliminary ruling, (vi) if the preliminary ruling is in
the event in favour of the rights claimed, the party entitled to those rights is
likely to have suffered irremediable damage unless given such interim pro-
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C. The Judgment of the Court of Justice and the Opinion of Advocate
General Tesauro
In a concise judgment, the Court ofJustice interpreted the
question before it to be whether a national court that believes
that a rule of national law is the sole obstacle preventing it
from granting inteim relief in a case concerning Community
law must disapply that rule.' 3' The manner in which the Court
of Justice rephrased the House of Lords' question allowed it to
rule that national courts must have the power to grant interim
relief without addressing the second part of the Lords' ques-
tion concerning the criteria national courts must employ in de-
ciding whether to grant such relief.1 32 The question thus for-
mulated, the Court of Justice held that a national court con-
fronting an issue of Community law must set aside any national
rule that it considers to be the sole obstacle preventing it from
granting interim relief.'33 As Professor Toth observes, it is
doubtful whether the judgment, as formulated, provides the
legal basis for U.K. courts to create the necessary jurisdiction
to grant interim relief where none existed before. 34
tection, does Community law either (a) oblige the national court to grant
such interim protection of the rights claimed; or (b) give the court power to
grant such interim protection of the rights claimed? 2. If question 1(a) is
answered in the negative and question 1 (b) in the affirmative, what are the
criteria to be applied in deciding whether or not to grant such interim pro-
tection of the rights claimed?
Id. In August 1989, the Commission of the European Communities brought an Arti-
cle 169 action against the United Kingdom alleging infringement of Community law
by the nationality provisions of the 1988 Act, and applied to the Court ofJustice for
an interim injunction under Article 186 for suspension of enforcement of those pro-
visions. See Re Nationality of Fishermen: Commission v. United Kingdom, Case
246/89R, 1989 E.C.R. -, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 601. The President of the Court of
Justice, Ole Due, granted the requested injunction to suspend application of the con-
tested nationality requirements. Id. at 610. Parliament complied with the President's
order and amended the 1988 Act to give effect to that order. Merchant Shipping Act
1988 (Amendment) Order 1989, S.I. 1989 No. 2006.
131. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame, Case C-
213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] CEC 189, 220.
132. Id.
133. Factortame, Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
[1990] 2 CEC at 221.
134. See Toth, Court ofJustice Decision in Factortame, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 573,
586 (1990). Professor Toth states that
[i]t is clear from the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of the House of
Lords that the main difficulty encountered by them was not so much that
English law contained a positive rule preventing the courts from granting in-
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The Court of Justice rested its conclusion upon two main
points of Community law. 135 The Court of Justice first reiter-
ated its established precedent that the manner of the protec-
tion of directly effective rights depends, under Article 5 princi-
ples of cooperation, upon national procedural and substantive
law. "'36 To this effect, the Court of Justice cited its 1980judg-
ments in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Ariete S.p.A. 137
and Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. MIRECO. '38 Ariete
and MIRECO both cite the established principle that in the ab-
sence of Community norms governing a particular area of law,
each national legal system must designate the courts and pro-
cedures necessary to protect directly effective Community
rights.' 39 It is a corollary of this principle that such national
conditions cannot be less favorable than those relating to simi-
lar actions of a domestic nature. 140 Under no circumstances,
however, may national conditions be such as to make the exer-
cise of directly effective Community rights practically impossi-
ble.' 4 1
The Court of Justice recalled its holding in Simmenthal II
that directly applicable rules of Community law render auto-
matically inapplicable any conflicting national provisions and
must be fully and uniformly applied throughout the Commu-
nity.' 42 The Court of Justice emphasized the principle in Sim-
terim injunctions against the Crown as the absence of jurisdiction to do so....
The problem is that "setting aside" (or "disapplying") an existing rule can-
not, by the nature of things, have the legal effect of creating jurisdiction for
the courts where none existed before. This requires some positive, creative
action: the courts must "devise" a remedy. Will the judgment, as formu-
lated, provide a legal basis for the courts to do so?
Id. (emphasis in original).
135. Factortame, Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
[1990] 2 CEC at 221.
136. Id.
137. Case 811/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2545, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8693.
138. Case 826/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8694.
139. Anete, Case 811/79, 1980 E.C.R. at 2554, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8308 (citing Rewe-Zentrafinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland, Case 33/76,
1976 E.C.R. 1989, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8382, and Comet BV v. Produktschap
voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, 1976 E.C.R. 2043, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8383).
140. Ariete, Case 811/79, 1980 E.C.R. at 2555, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
8308; MIRECO, Case 826/79, 1980 E.C.R. at 2575, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8319.
141. Id.
142. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited,
Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 189, 221.
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menthal H that any national legal or judicial practice that might
hinder the effectiveness of Community law by withholding
from a national court the "power to do everything necessary"
forthwith to set aside conflicting national law is itself incompat-
ible with Community law.' 43 The Court of Justice applied this
principle to the rule of U.K. law according to which U.K.
courts, even in cases governed by Community law, lack the ju-
risdiction to order the temporary disapplication of national
law.' 44 The Court of Justice thus concluded that "a court
which in those circumstances would grant interim relief," were
it not for the national rule, must disapply that rule. 45 The
Court of Justice left unaddressed, however, the question of
how a national court would decide whether or not such circum-
stances were present in a given situation. 146
In his opinion, the Advocate General noted that the two
obstacles to the exercise by U.K. courts of the power to grant
interim relief were the presumption of validity that attaches to
a statute until a final determination is made, and the impossi-
bility of granting an injunction against the Crown. 147 The Ad-
vocate General restricted his discussion to the interim protec-
tion of rights claimed under directly effective Community
law.' 48  The Advocate General observed that effective interim
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 205. The Advocate General phrased the precise question before the
Court in the following terms:
Pending a ruling by the Court ofJustice on the interpretation of provisions
of Community law having direct effect, and where UK law does not permit
the national court to suspend, by way of interim relief, the application of the
allegedly conflicting national measure and thus, provisionally, to acknowl-
edge an individual's right claimed under Community law but denied by na-
tional law: i) must (or may) the national court grant such relief on the basis
of Community law? ii) If so, applying what criteria?
Id. at 203.
148. Id. at 206. The interpretation of the substantive Treaty provisions relied
upon by the appellants was the subject of separate proceedings before the Court of
Justice. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
Case C-221/89, action broughtJuly 17, 1989 (judgment not yet delivered).
In 1986, the British government enacted legislation designed to control "quota
hopping" by introducing new crewing, social security, and operating conditions for
vessels fishing against U.K. quotas. See Churchill, supra 102, at 214-15. These condi-
tions were challenged before U.K. courts for their compatibility with Community law.
Id. at 219. In each of the cases the court made reference under Article 177 to the
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relief is available in all Member States, 49 save possibly Den-
mark and the United Kingdom, and concluded that a national
court must have the power to set aside provisionally a national
law that conflicts with Community law.' 50
The Advocate General's opinion first reiterated the princi-
ple in Simmenthal H that directly effective' Community provi-
sions confer enforceable legal rights on individuals from the
date of their entry into force, regardless of contrary national
provisions. 5 ' The Advocate General stressed, however, that
he would not engage in a "sterile dialectical discussion" of the
theoretical basis of thesupremacy of Community law.' 52 The
Advocate General noted that in this case at least, the effective
protection of Community rights is more important than the
theoretical basis upon which it rests. 5 3
The Advocate General recalled that national procedures
must be able to ensure the practical exercise of rights that the
national courts are obliged to protect. 4 The Advocate Gen-
Court of Justice. Id. The validity of the crewing and social security conditions was
challenged in Regina v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Agegate
Ltd., Case C-3/87, 1989 E.C.R. -, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366. InAgegate, the Court of
Justice upheld the validity of the social security condition but invalidated the crewing
condition. Agegate, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 399-400. The validity of the operating con-
ditions was challenged, and upheld, in Regina v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food ex parteJaderow Ltd., Case C-216/87, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 265.
149. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Limited,
Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. at -, [1990] 2 CEC 189, 212.
150. Id. at 214-15.
151. Id. at 206.
152. Id. The Advocate General said that "[w]hat matters, in so far as is relevant
in this case, is that the national court is obliged to afford judicial protection to the
rights conferred by a Community provision as from the entry into force of that provi-
sion and for so long as it continues in force." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 207; see Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ffir das
Saarland, Case 33/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8382; see also
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana S.r., Case 61/79,
1980 E.C.R. 1205, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8665. The Court ofJustice stated in
Denkavit that
[i]n the absence of Community rules concerning the contesting or the recov-
ery of national charges which have been unlawfully demanded or wrongfully
levied, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate
the courts having jurisdiction and determine the procedural conditions gov-
erning actions at law intended to safeguard the rights which subjects derive
from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such con-
ditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a
domestic nature and that under no circumstances may they be so adapted as to make
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eral noted that, absent a harmonized system of procedure, the
methods for protecting Community rights remain those pro-
vided by the domestic law of Member States. 55 The Advocate
General stressed, however, that this principle requires that na-
tional procedures be as favorable to Community rights as
those procedures applying to the protection of national
rights. 56 The Advocate General's opinion recalled the princi-
ple in Simmenthal II that national courts must apply EEC law
either through available national methods or, failing that, of
their own motion.5 7
The third element of the Advocate General's opinion fo-
cused on the critical role of interim relief in any judicial sys-
tem.15 8  The Advocate General noted the gap between the
point in time when a Community right comes into existence
and later, when the existence of the right is definitively estab-
lished. 59 The Advocate General stated that under the Article
177 procedure, judicial review only postpones the establish-
ment of the right to a later point in time. 60 Once established,
the right is given retroactive effect.' 6' The Advocate General
it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts are bound to
protect.
Id. at 1226, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8665, at 7879 (emphasis added).
155. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Limited,
Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. _. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 189, 206-
07.
156. Id. at 207.
157. Id.; see Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A.,
Case 106/77, 1978 E.C.R. 629, 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476.
158. Factortame, Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
[1990] 2 CEC at 211.
159. Id. at 208-09. The Advocate General noted that
[t]he problem arises from the fact that in a structured and intricate context
which a modern system of judicial protection demands there is a lack of con-
temporaneity between the two points in time which mark the course of the law,
namely the point when the right comes into existence and the point (later on)
when the existence of the right is (definitively) established.
Id. (emphasis in original).
160. Id. at 209.
161. Id. The Advocate General noted that
[w]hat is important to stress is that at the time when an application is made
the right already exists (or does not) and the provision which confers that
right on (or denies it to) the individual is lawful or unlawful. The procedure
for judicial review merely postpones the establishment of the existence of
the right, that is to say its full and effective operation, to a later point in time
and subject to the "retroactivity" of the effects of the actual establishment of
the right.
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noted that this is also true in a national system when a decision
must be made between two or more applicable, but conflicting,
provisions. 62 In this situation, the Advocate General added,
the ultimately applicable provision is deemed to have been ef-
fective when the petition for review was made, because at that
time only the establishment of the right, and not its existence,
was lacking.'6 3 The Advocate General observed that the very
purpose of interim relief is to ensure that the time needed to
establish the existence of the right does not irremediably de-
prive the right of substance.1 64 This applies especially where,
as here, the determination of the existence of the right involves
the prior review of the validity, or compatibility, of one provi-
sion vis-d-vis another of a higher order. 65
The Advocate General argued that the U.K. "presumption
of validity" of acts of Parliament was not an obstacle to the
interim protection of enforceable legal rights. 66 The Advo-
cate General noted that it is precisely because a presumption is
involved that an interim remedy is needed to compensate for
the fact that the final ruling establishing the Community right
may come too late to benefit the successful party. 67 Where a
national provision allegedly conflicts with another "of a higher
order or having precedence," both the national and the
"higher" provision hypothetically apply from the moment the
petition for judicial review is made.' 68  The Advocate General
stated that the presumption of validity attaches to both-in this
case an act of Parliament and Community provisions-and that
both give rise to putative rights.'6 9
Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 210.
165. Id. at 211.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 212.
169. Id. Advocate General Tesauro stated that
[i]n a procedural situation of the type with which we are concerned here, in
which one provision is alleged to be incompatible with another of a higher
order or having precedence, it is essential, as has already been stressed, to bear
in mind the fact that both provisions hypothetically apply to the case in question from the
moment when the application is made. That is especially so since the final deter-
mination, whose consequences are made to take effect from the time of the
application, creates nothing new as regards the existence (or the non-exist-
1990-1991] FACTORTAME
The Advocate General concluded that the national court
must have the power and the discretion to assess whether the
nature of the right alleged is such that interim protection must
be granted or refused.1 7 0 This depends on the extent to which
each provision appears to be valid, as well as the possibility
and severity of prejudice to the competing parties' interests if a
provisional remedy is denied. 1 7 ' Consequently, if a national
court must disapply a national law when it is found to conflict
with a directly effective Community provision, then that court
must also be able to disapply that law provisionally pending
the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice.172
ence) of the right claimed because the provisions in point are hypothetically
valid and operative in the alternative (or invalid and inoperative) and to
both is attached what is commonly called a presumption of validity, whilst
what is postponed, owing to the time taken by the proceedings, is merely the
point in time at which the final determination is made.
Id. (emphasis in original).
170. Id.
171. Id. The Advocate General noted that
[t]o give priority to the national legislation merely because it has not yet
been definitively established as incompatible with Community law-and thus
to proceed on the basis merely of a putative compatibility-may amount to depriving
the Community rules of the effective judicial protection which is to be af-
forded to them "from the date of their entry into force and for so long as
they continue in force." Paradoxically, the right conferred (putatively) by
the provision of Community law would as a general rule receive less, or less
effective, protection than the rights conferred (also putatively) by the provi-
sion of national law.
Id. at 214 (emphasis in original). Advocate General Tesauro further observed that
the majority of Member States already provide the interim protection of'rights de-
nied under a lower ranking provision, but claimed under a higher ranking provision.
Id. at 212. He added that
there is no doubt that, by means of preliminary rulings given by the Court of
Justice and the "direct" competence of national courts, machinery has been
introduced which essentially consists of the review of the validity (or of com-
patibility, if this is preferred) of a national provision in relation to a Commu-
nity provision, given that the national courts have jurisdiction to rule defini-
tively that the former is incompatible with the latter. And if therefore the
national courts may, indeed must, disapply a national law which conflicts
with a Community provision having direct effect, once a definitive finding
has been made to that effect (or, at any rate, must achieve that substantive
result), they must also be able to disapply that law provsionally, provided
that the preconditions are satisfied, where the incompatibility is not entirely
certain or "established" but may call for a preliminary ruling by the Court of
Justice.
Id. at 213-14.
172. Id. The Advocate General proposed the following answers to the House of
Lords' questions:
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III. THE FACTORTAME JUDGMENT DOES NOT
DIRECTLY CONFRONT THE U.K VIEW OF
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY, BUT
U.K COURTS RECOGNIZE THE
SUPREMACY OF COMMUNITY LA W
A. The Immediate Consequence of Factortame
The immediate consequence of Factortame is to vest U.K.
courts with the jurisdiction to order the temporary disapplica-
tion of any provision of national law which the court believes
may conflict with Community law.' 73  As such, the judgment
can be viewed in Community law terms as a fairly narrow one
that has a solid basis in established Court ofJustice case law. 74
The judgment, therefore, is an extension of Court of Justice
jurisprudence that already required the effective protection of
Community and national rights. 75 In Simmenthal H, for exam-
1) The obligation imposed by Community law on the national court to en-
sure the effective judicial protection of rights directly conferred on the indi-
vidual by provisions of Community law includes the obligation, if the need
arises and where the factual and legal preconditions are met, to afford in-
terim and urgent protection to rights claimed on the basis of such provision
of Community law, pending a final determination and any interpretation by
way of a preliminary ruling given by the Court of Justice.
2) In the absence of Community harmonisation, it is the legal system of
each member state which determines the procedural methods and the pre-
conditions for the interim protection of rights vested in individuals by virtue
of provisions of Community law having direct effect, on condition that those
methods and preconditions do not make it impossible to exercise on an in-
terim basis the rights claimed and are not less favourable than those pro-
vided for in order to afford protection to rights founded on national provi-
sions, any provision of national law or any national practice having such an
effect being incompatible with Community law.
Id. at 217-18; see supra note 130 (containing questions posed by House of Lords).
173. See Toth, supra note 134, at 583 (noting strong Court ofJustice precedent
favoring availability of interim relief under Community law).
174. Id. at 585-86; see Barav, Enforcement of Community Rights in the National Courts:
The Case for Jurisdiction to Grant an Interim Relief, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 369, 379
(1989) (noting that presumption of validity of national legislation may not deprive
courts of power to grant interim relief); Francis, United Kingdom Case Note-Factortame
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 274 (1990) (arguing for propriety under Community law of
national court jurisdiction to entertain requests for interim protection); Hanna, Com-
munity Rights All At Sea, 106 L.Q.R. 2, 8 (1990) (advocating availability under Commu-
nity law of interim injunction against Crown); Lewis, Case and Comment-Statutes and
the EEC. Interim Relief and the Crown, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 347, 349 (1989) (advocating
court jurisdiction to grant interim relief against Crown under U.K. law).
175. See infra note 180 (discussing requirement of effective protection of Com-
munity rights under Court ofJustice jurisprudence).
1990-1991] FACTORTAME
pie, the Court of Justice already had precluded the valid adop-
tion of subsequent inconsistent national law. 176 The Court of
Justice required that national courts be able to give full and
automatic effect to Community rules by refusing, of their own
motion, to apply any conflicting national rules.'
77
Moreover, in Salgoil S.p.A. v. Italian Ministry for Foreign
Trade, 17 1 the Court of Justice held that national courts must
protect persons subject to their jurisdiction who may be af-
fected by a possible infringement of the Treaty by ensuring the
"direct and immediate" protection of their interests.' 79 Salgoil
and its progeny stand for the proposition that any national rule
or procedure which denies national courts the ability to pro-
vide effective protection of Community rights violates Commu-
nity law.' 8 0 In UNECTEF v. Heylens,' 8 ' for example, the Court
of Justice said that the existence of a judicial remedy against
any decision of a national authority refusing the benefit of a
fundamental and directly effective right is essential for its effec-
tive protection. 82 In Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary,' the Court ofJustice had stated that the Member
States are obliged to ensure that appropriate legislation and
effective judicial procedures exist to give effect to Community
rights. ' 84
B. Does the U.K. Approach to Supremacy Survive?
The Factortame judgment does not directly invalidate the
United Kingdom's "interpretative" and dualist approach to ac-
176. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case
106/77, 1978 E.C.R. 629, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8476.
177. Id.
178. Case 13/68, 1968 E.C.R. 453, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8072.
179. Id. at 463, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8072, at 8063.
180. See, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Ariete S.p.A., Case
811/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2545, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8693; see Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.p.A San Giorgio, Case 199/82, 1983 E.C.R. 3595, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. 14,045; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fir das
Saarland, Case 33/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8382; Comet
BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, 1976 E.C.R. 2043, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8383; see also Barav, supra note 174, at 379.
181. Case 222/86, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1989] 1 CEC
131.
182. Id. at 411, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1989] 1 CEC at 145.
183. Case 222/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,304.
184. Id. at 1682, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,304, at 16,887.
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comodating directly effective EEC law.' 8 5 A central aspect of
the United Kingdom and the House of Lords' position was the
presumption, based on the express language of the European
Communities Act 1972, that an act of Parliament is to be inter-
preted consistently with EEC law unless and until it has been
declared to be incompatible. 86 The Lords thus accepted that
an act of Parliament must be construed consistently with EEC
law after the Court of Justice has delivered its Article 177 rul-
ing. 187 Because the Court ofJustice's ruling under Article 177
is only declarative of what Community law has been since com-
ing into effect,18 8 the ruling does not change the substance of
Community law.' 89 There is no reason, therefore, to exclude
the possibility of interim relief because, as both national and
Community provisions hypothetically apply pending the rul-
ing, the possibly applicable act of Parliament can be construed
consistently with the claimed Community rights without fur-
ther infringing the "validity" of the act.' 90
The Factortame judgment only seems to require that U.K.
courts possess the jurisdiction to apply the same "interpreta-
185. See Toth, supra note 134, at 585 ("Therefore, when a court in the United
Kingdom sets aside [a conflicting] Act of Parliament, whether temporarily or defini-
tively . . .such a court merely obeys a 'command' given to it by Parliament itself
(which 'command' continues to bind the courts as long as the 1972 Act remains in
force)."); see Gravells, Disapplying An Act of Parliament Pending a Preliminary Ruling: Con-
stitutional Enormity or Community Law Right?, PUB. L. 568 (1989); see also Tillotson,
"Fish, Please, But No Beef ". Recent Controversial Issues Affecting Intra-Community Trade, 13
WORLD COMP. L. & EcON. REV. 33, 50 (1990).
186. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1989]
3 C.M.L.R. 1, 23 (H.L.).
187. Id. at 23-24.
188. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana S.r.l.,
Case 61/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1205, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8665. The Court of
Justice in Denkavit noted that
[tihe interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon
it by Article 177, the Court ofJustice gives to a rule of Community law clari-
fies and defines where necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it
must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its
coming into force, It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and
must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and estab-
lished before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, pro-
vided that in other respects the conditions enabling an action relating to the
application of that rule to be brought before the courts having jurisdiction,
are satisfied.
Id. at 1223, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8665, at 7877-78.
189. See Gravells, supra note 185, at 580.
190. Id. at 581-83.
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tive" method to disapply an act of Parliament at an earlier
stage in the review process.' 91 The interpretative U.K. ap-
proach does not challenge Parliament's sovereignty because
the question of the validity of the subsequent Parliamentary
legislation does not arise.' 9 2 In an interim relief situation, and
absent evidence of expressly contrary intent, the validity of the
hypothetically applicable act is also unaffected because the act
can be "construed" consistently with Community law pending
the Article 177 ruling. Moreover, the practical protection of
Community rights is assured because the court temporarily
disapplies an "unclear" or "ambiguous" act of Parliament. 93
The required interim protection can thus be justified in reli-
ance upon sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act
1972 without any further compromise of the "validity" of acts
of Parliament. 194
C. The Sovereignty of Parliament Is Subject to the Rule of
Community Law
The compatibility of the Factortame judgment with the
traditional U.K. approach to supremacy may suggest that the
Court of Justice is willing to countenance differing theoretical
approaches to the supremacy of Community law among the
legal systems of the Member States. '9 Any such willingness,
however, depends on the assurance of the effective protection
191. See Toth, supra note 134, at 585.
192. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing inability of U.K. courts
to question validity of acts of Parliament). Professor Gravells argues that when the
determination of the existence of a right involves a choice between two provisions of
a higher and lower order, there can be no presumption as to the effect of either.
Gravells, supra note 185, at 580-8 1. Professor Gravells observed that
[u]ntil a national court, or the European Court, has ruled definitively on the
interpretation of Community law in the context of the 1988 Act, the position
is simply that the meaning of the Act is unclear. And it is precisely in such a
situation that it would seem to be appropriate for a court to grant interim
relief in order to protect, so far as possible, the relevant interests.
Id. at 581 (emphasis in original).
193. Gravells, supra note 185, at 581.
194. Id.
195. In the view ofJudge Kakouris, for example, "[l]a Cour dejustice n'a pas en
effet pour r6le de proc6der a des constructions doctrinales, mais de proc6der i la
solution des questions concrtes qui lui ont t6 soumises. La synth~se de lajurispru-
dence de la Cour dejustice ... est fond~e sur cette methode d'approche." Kakouris,
supra note 3, at 330.
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of Community rights.' 96 It might be suggested that Advocate
General Tesauro's practical perspective represents a certain ju-
dicial restraint that may distinguish the present Court of Jus-
tice from that of the 1960s and 197 0s.' 97 Nevertheless, the
emphasis of the Factortame judgment upon the principles of
Simmenthal II suggests that monist reasoning remains essential
to the Court of Justice's jurisprudence in its treatment of the
relationship of Community and national law.
Although the Factortame judgment seems compatible with
the U.K. "interpretative" approach to supremacy, and thus
with the traditional view of the sovereignty of Parliament, the
Court ofJustice appears to have effectively limited the practical
value of these approaches. In Murphy v. Bord Telecom Eireann, 9 '
the Court ofJustice held that a national court must, where pos-
sible, interpret and apply domestic law in a manner consistent
with Community law.' 99 To the extent that such interpretation
is not possible, however, Murphy held that the national court
must disapply the conflicting domestic law.200 Community law
since Costa requires a national court to disapply a conflicting
national law when such a law cannot, even under an interpreta-
196. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
Case C-213/89, 1989 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC at 206-07.
197. Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 37-38. Professor Rasmussen comments that
in its endeavour to "make Europe" the European Court [has gone] too far
too often. In defiance of much European tradition, the European Court en-
gaged in a teleological, pro-Community crusade, the banner of which fea-
tured a deep involvement which led it to give primacy to pro-integrationist
public policies over competing ones that were often, even outside of the
ring of losing litigants, considered as meriting some protection. Moreover,
this engagement seemed to increase throughout the 1970s despite the
emergence of numerous warning signs indicating that society was in the
process of undergoing change away from the immediate post World War II
ideologies so favourable to the inception of the European Communities with
their professed supranational aspirations.
id. at 37.
198. Case 157/86, 1988 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,445.
199. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,445, at 18, 156.
200. Id. The Court of Justice stated in Murphy that
[i]t is for the national court, within the limits of its discretion under national
law, when interpreting and applying domestic law, to give to it, where possi-
ble, an interpretation which accords with the requirements of the applicable
Community law and, to the extent that this is not possible, to hold such domestic law
inapplicable.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tive method, be read consistently with Community law.20 ' The
Court of Justice thus requires that, where necessary, Commu-
nity law be able to pierce the veil of the interpretative ap-
proach.
The willingness of U.K. courts to employ this interpreta-
tive practice suggests that they recognize that Parliamentary
sovereignty is subject to the rule of Community law.20 2 Fol-
lowing the Court of Justice's preliminary ruling in Factortame,
in June 1990 the appellants returned to the House of Lords to
seek further interim relief relating to the domicile and resi-
dence requirements of the 1988 Act.20 3 The House of Lords
allowed the appeal and granted the requested new interim in-
20junction. 04 Lord Goff of Chieveley developed the general
principles by which the discretion of U.K. courts should be
guided in appropriate situations in deciding whether to grant
interim relief.20 1 While Lord Bridge reiterated that the obliga-
tions imposed by Community law on U.K. courts derive from
the European Communities Act 1972, he noted explicitly that
upon accession to the EEC, Parliament voluntarily accepted
the limitations on sovereignty inherent in the EEC Treaty and
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. 20 6  Lord Bridge's
201. Id.
202. A.V. DICEY, supra note 11, at 413-14; see supra notes 53-61 and accompany-
ing text (discussing relationship between doctrines of sovereignty of Parliament and
rule or supremacy of law).
203. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 375 (H.L.).
204. Id. at 406.
205. Id. at 394-98.
206. Id. at 379-80. Lord Bridge stated that
[i]f the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over
the national law of member-States was not always inherent in the EEC
Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community.
Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it en-
acted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under
the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a
United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule
of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable Commu-
nity law. Similarly, when decisions of the European Court of Justice have
exposed areas of United Kingdom statute law which failed to implement
Council directives, Parliament has always loyally accepted the obligation to
make appropriate and prompt amendments. Thus there is nothing in any
way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas
to which they apply and to insist that, in the protection of rights under Coin-
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concise dicta may signal an evolution towards greater accept-
ance of the legal implications of the "practical politics" of
Community membership.
Moreover, judicial respect for the higher constitutional
value of Community solidarity is evident in the U.K. judiciary's
willingness to fix the scope and content of acts of Parliament
by reference to the fundamental principles of Community
law.2 7 The British constitution rests upon the twin pillars of
the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule or supremacy of
law.2° s While U.K. courts must give effect to the clearly ex-
pressed intentions of Parliament, 20 9 the requirements of the
rule of law are reflected in traditional presumptions that courts
have adopted to assist them in ascertaining the meaning of acts
of Parliament. 210 The rule of law requires that ambiguities in
the interpretation of statutes be resolved, so far as possible, in
accordance with traditional common law notions of fairness
and justice.2 ' In this manner, judicial adherence to the rule of
law in the United Kingdom fulfills a function not unlike the
protection afforded by the formal Bill of Rights and the re-
quirements of due process in the U.S. system. 2  To the extent
munity law, national courts must not be inhibited by rules of national law
from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical
recognition of that supremacy.
Id. (citations omitted).
207. See Allan, The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty, PUB. L. 614, 618-19 (1985);
see also Allan, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning's Dexterous Revolution, 3 OXFORDJ.
OF LEGAL STUD. 22, 31 (1983) (arguing that "bold and creative statutory interpreta-
tion" may indicate acceptance of a limited degree of entrenchment).
208. See supra note 18 (discussing Professor Dicey's doctrine of sovereignty of
Parliament); Allan, supra note 56, at 113 (discussing Professor Dicey's doctrine of
supremacy of law).
209. See Allan, supra note 56, at 121.
210. See id. at 119.
211. Allan, supra note 56, at 133.
212. Id. at 136; see U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIV. Lord Coke's dictum in Bon-
ham's Case 8 Co. Rep. 177a, 118a, 77 E.R. 638, 652 (1609), is widely viewed as fore-
shadowing the U.S. doctrine of judicial review. See Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54
L.Q.R. 543 (1938). According to Professor Thorne, however, Lord Coke in Bonham 's
Case was not appealing to natural or higher law that Parliament could not contravene,
but to a familiar common law rule of statutory construction that invalidates statutory
"repugnancies" or contradictions. Id. at 549. According to Professor Thorne, this
general principle of statutory interpretation was best expressed in Lord Coke's cele-
brated dictum:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases the common law will con-
troul acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void:
For when an act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or re-
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that the scope and content of a statute are necessarily incom-
plete or uncertain upon enactment, U.K. courts interpret legis-
lation, and fix its scope and content in a particular case, con-
sistently with the fundamental values of society and the legal
order. 21 3
This rule of interpretation that limits the scope of acts of
Parliament in deference to basic principles of political morality
is similar to the "interpretation" of acts of Parliament accord-
ing to Community law. Just as the rule of law inhibits Parlia-
ment from enacting legislation contrary to fundamental values
of the common law, the willingness of U.K. courts to interpret
acts of Parliament as subject to Community law signals judicial
recognition that the sovereignty of Parliament is subject to the
rule of Community solidarity.
CONCLUSION
Legal differences between the Court of Justice and U.K.
approaches to the supremacy of Community law continue to
exist. In Factortame, the Court of Justice, while requiring that
U.K. courts exercise the jurisdiction to disapply acts of Parlia-
ment temporarily, did not directly disturb the U.K.'s dualist
approach to supremacy. Yet the willingness of U.K. courts to
interpret, and where the interpretative veil is insufficient, to
hold subsequent inconsistent legislation to be subject to Com-
munity law, indicates that U.K. courts recognize that parlia-
mentary sovereignty is now subject to the fundamental polit-
ical value of Community solidarity. The rule or supremacy of
pugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it,
and adjudge such act to be void.
Bonham's Case, 77 E.R. at 652; see Thorne, supra at 544. Compare id. with Plucknett,
Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 31 (1926) ("The solution
which Coke found [to curb the rising power of Crown and Parliament] was in the idea
of a fundamental law which limited Crown and Parliament indifferently.") and E.
CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50-53
(1957). Corwin concluded that "[a]t the very least, therefore, we can assert that in
Bonham's Case Coke deemed himself to be enforcing a rule of construction of statutes
of higher intrinsic validity than any act of Parliament as such." Id. at 50 (emphasis
added).
213. Allan, supra note 56, at 140. Professor Allan stated that "[p]roblems of
ambiguity or omission, if they arise under the language of an Act, should be resolved
so as to give effect to, or at the very least so as not to derogate from, the rights
recognised by Magna Carta." Id. at 136.
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Community law may have achieved a status which was once
only accorded to Magna'Carta.
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